Lyledunn

That is a very good question and one that I am keen to get an answer for, albeit a different situation. AnthonyB is the expert and I note his post above. I provide technical advice for the NI Federation of Clubs which has a large membership of private member clubs. They are obviously not identical but they all have very common features when it comes to fire safety. Many are run on a voluntary basis with a high turnover of either voluntary or part-time staff so the fire safety strategy has to be as simple as possible. Most venues are littered with extinguishers of all types. It has been made clear by NIFRS that they expect to see appropriate levels of training in the use of the devices irrespective of the status of those in charge of the premises. The strategy employed by many clubs in the past was for immediate evacuation in the event of a fire and no one other than the FRS should use extinguishers. The strategy was accepted for many years by inspecting authorities, or perhaps a blind eye was turned to it. That is no longer the case. It seems that NIFRS is taking a much more robust approach in this regard. That being the case, it would seem reasonable that a single, versatile extinguisher such as water mist would be a prudent approach. However, it seems that many extinguisher providers who supply and maintain systems in our clubs are adamant that water mist is a poor substitute for current provision. Do they have a point?

Don’t forget that the latest standard you refer to AB is for domestic and similar installations. Irrespective of any regulatory imperative, it may be prudent to have the equipment enclosed in appropriately rated construction, if not for life safety then for property protection/ business continuity. I speak from bitter experience for as a young electrical contractor just starting to make a future, I razed to the ground a fair part of a National Trust facility. As it turned out, there was a component failure where a poorly constructed fuse carrier in a heavily loaded switchfuse caused the connection to overheat. The cable insulation burned back and molten parts fell on combustible material that had gathered around the bottom of the equipment. The place was undergoing refurbishment at the time and there was a big push to open. A fully fire resisting enclosure was in place but the builder hadn’t fitted the doors to it and staff had piled cardboard boxes smack up against it. The investigation team acknowledged that it was component failure but it didn’t do my reputation any good at all! What it did do though, was to give me an abiding interest in fire safety and that has been with me for forty years!

Even if you were not legally obliged to keep the system operational, it would be an act of brutal indifference to your tenants to blatingly ignore the original intention of the system. By the way, likely severe penalties ahead for some folk who allowed Primark Belfast to open without a fully functioning sprinkler system.

I was still contracting back in the late 90’s and any fire alarm we installed the sounder circuits, trigger circuits and the 230v supply to the panel were all appropriately fire-rated. Just be aware that fire resisting cable was also available in white. Sometimes electricians just cut the earth out, so do check before you start tipping things asunder. When you say the existing cables are trunk housed, be careful that the replacement cable is properly secured. I note extensive use of plastic trunking in premises like HMOs. If the cables or trunking are not properly secured by fire resisting clips, when attacked by fire collapse can occur which could cause system malfunction as well as being a danger to firefighters.

It would be a tad bit easier if fire risk assessments were just a simple audit for compliance. But they are not, and by their very nature, they are subjective and that inevitably leads to disagreements between the various parties, which in turn, can boil over into acerbic discord. It is not always necessary for a building to be fully compliant, whatever that means, to have a tolerable risk to persons from fire. However, there are some fundamental considerations such as compartmentation, fire stopping, means of escape, means of giving warning that, whilst also subjective, should be close to current expectations of compliance. Where deviations are encountered in these areas, it is my view that the assessor should set out a detailed justification for any proposed course of action or indeed inaction. It is also inevitable that even diligent professionals will miss something obvious. At the end of the day it should be acknowledged that we should all work together, assessor, client, FRS, et al, to arrive at an optimum level of fire safety, even if some individual’s nose ends up severely out of joint. If I were you, I think I would be back on to my assessor and ask him or her to have a chat with the fire officer. If you decide not to follow the fire officers recommendations, you would be well advised to set out a comprehensive justification for not doing so.

This type of situation was one of several issues that caused the demise of a hotel project in the centre of Belfast. Unfortunately the fairly well-known developer had failed to take it into account. The neighbour objected to the development and refused access to the escape route which was under his control. Irrespective of the legalities, a court case could have went on for years to establish right to use. We had no option but to cut a big hole through the floor slab from top to bottom and provide an independent stair. I would take Anthony’s advice and go for a detailed assessment along with a structural survey that considers your proposals for the building.

Any one observing people in the U.K. today would acknowledge the terrible blight of obesity. As far as I am aware, the number of folk that could move through a unit of exit width of 550mm was determined post 2nd world war by the number of gendarmes that could pass through per minute. Turned out to be 40 thus it was contended that if a building was to be evacuated in 2.5 minutes, a unit of exit width would allow for 100 persons. By extrapolation, a standard 1050mm door width would permit 200. That original model has been adjusted somewhat but as far as I can see, it is still employed. I bet not one single gendarme was a fatty with mobility issues!

Thank you Green Foam. The reason I ask is to get the perspective of a fire risk assessor. The intent of the regulation is to guard against ignition sources from appliances rather than from the fixed wiring, otherwise why would they be required only for socket outlet circuits? The regulation also sees the risk as a life safety one as the situations where AFDDs are required are demonstrably ones that have difficult conditions in terms of evacuation in a fire. So the conclusion must be that these devices are regarded as an important aspect in mitigating the risk to human life from fires that have a source in electrical appliances that are connected to socket outlets. Surely that is exactly the sort of thing a fire risk assessor should be considering. It is irrelevant as to when the devices became mandatory as far as BS7671 is concerned. Buildings probably pre-date many basic fire control measures but that doesn’t necessarily mean that the building need not have them.

Given the explicit requirement of BS7671 for these devices in care homes, high rise residential buildings, student accommodation and HMOs, will fire risk assessments of such premises acknowledge their absence in existing buildings within this group? I ask because many in the electrical installation industry do not share the view that these devices are an effective means of reducing fire statistics where the ignition source is electrical in nature. Quite apart from the view of whether they actually function, there is no sufficiently detailed body of fire statistics that could be referred to in order to form a valid opinion.

We are refurbishing a relatively small ground floor shop fully compartmented with the only other floor above. Main Street small town. Travel distance is slightly over 20m to the single exit. BC have turned our application down on the grounds that TD exceeds 18m. The guidance supporting our building regulations for fire safety in NI is Technical Booklet E. It allows travel distance to be extended to 27m in small premises but with the caveat that no floor area exceeds 90m2. ADB permits the same extension providing the floor area does not exceed 285m2. This shop has a floor area of 160m2. I am withdrawing the application and making a new one using ADB to support my claim that I am meeting functional requirements. I could use BS9999 2017 but for some reason neither BC or NIFRS are happy with its use on existing buildings. What an interesting mess fire safety is!

Anthony, it is a substantially enclosed kitchen with serving hatch to the front which in no way would compromise escape. To some extent I would be delighted if Building Regulations mandated suppression below all commercial-type kitchen canopies as it would take away the ambiguity. I am just starting some research now into the guidance supporting the Building Regulations in relation to fire and ventilation. Thank you as always for your helpful contributions to my posts, it is much appreciated.

A new ventilation canopy in a relatively small but busy restaurant covers some brand new equipment with little or no grease laden fumes other than two small 10 litre deep fat fryers. The canopy duct work is approximately 4m long and remains in the same compartment without passing through fire resisting elements. BC has insisted on a suppression system although the FRA indicates that whilst it certainly has merits but isn’t warranted given the appliances currently in use below the canopy. A caveat on the FRA is that wet chemical extinguishers are provided and appropriate staff training provided. I can’t find anything in the building regulations that would definitely require suppression. Would appreciate comment.

I trust you will get the situation resolved but at the end of the day the key thing is that your premises are fire-safe. I don’t know the layout but the removal or redundancy of the external stairs would normally warrant a building control application. Relying solely on a fire risk assessor to give a green light on an issue that needs approval through the BC process was not, in my opinion, prudent. If I ruled the world, there would be few establishments with sleeping accommodation that didn’t offer an alternative means of escape!

I think the shutter must have been added after sign off. I doubt anyone would have considered it an acceptable emergency exit at design stage. Added for security perhaps? Clearly fire safety usurped if the opening was indeed the original emergency escape.

Our Fire Safety Regulations (NI) 2010 do not permit the use of sliding doors as emergency escape doors. I understand statutory regulations elsewhere in the U.K. have similar stipulations. The requirement seems to be widely flouted. I note many designs/FRAs referring to the need for fail safe operation but the regulations don’t have caveats that would support their use in any situation. Any views?

Looks like the situation would not require the corridor to be a “protected corridor” unless the mixed use you refer to relates to two different occupancies sharing the corridor. I think a look at the provision of cross corridor doors would be a reasonable issue to raise. The presence of MCB distribution boards in the corridor is really of no concern providing their enclosures don’t have gaping holes.

You wouldn’t get past BC here. 15x8=120m2 resulting in an occupant capacity of 240 persons using the generally accepted 1 person per 0.5m2 for a bar. An 870 door will give 110 persons. Given that you have to discount one exit, you are beat! Absolutely no way would it be permitted that you manage numbers on a new build or change of use situation. I am in NI by the way.

I imagine the risk with the consumption of food and drink is associated with the preparation of same and a rather blanket approach has been taken. We have a small completely open cafe facility planned for the centre of a sales floor. There will be no cooking and the only appliances will be a coffee machine and a refrigerated display. The island position does not meet the guidance implicit in 2.16 of ADB. I guess a solid case can be made for the relatively low risk but I suppose that could be defeated by subsequent additions if the cafe expanded. I note one local major blue chip retailer had fairly extensive facilities island-fashion with the exits available only by crossing the sales floor.

Just trying to think through the requirement in ADB and 9999 to provide at least two MOE from a storey which has an area set out for the consumption of food and drink and which is ancillary to the main use of the storey. 2.16 of ADB additionally requires that the MOE should lead direct to a storey exit and not via a kitchen or area of high fire hazard 16.3.8 of 9999 is the same but insists that the MOE should not be via the rest of the storey. First off, why the special attention on consumption of food and drink which is ancillary to the main use of the building? Secondly, what is the interpretation of ‘lead direct to a storey exit”? Is that effectively what 9999 is saying?

Tom, thanks for the reply. I am confident in my own interpretation of the technical side but I posted more out of frustration with BC than anything else. I know they are swamped in this city and they seem to be seeking any reason to reject an application to avoid increasing workload for officers. This is a poor state of affairs as projects are delayed unnecessarily while the issues are addressed through the system treacle. BC is Council only here in NI, unlike mainland U.K.

I have a plan in for a 90 seater ground floor restaurant with an enclosed kitchen with fairly large openings such that a fire would be obvious to patrons. Two MOE one at the opposite end to the kitchen and one which is accessed by passing by one of the openings. BC have rejected plan on the basis of the route passing the opening. TD is well within limits. On the principle that a fire will be in one place only, I see no issue. Would appreciate comments.

We don’t have AI’s here but as an erstwhile director responsible for compliance in a building refurbishment company where projects were mostly design and build, have continually found need to question determinations made by Building Control officers. I do so with the utmost respect but also with tenacity with my case founded on well-researched material. I have often been totally wrong but I have also saved my company many thousands of pounds. End of the day we all want compliant, safe and functional buildings. All parties in such disputes should be gracious rather than belligerent, which, unfortunately, can often be the case.

Why would you need to divide the corridor? Division only required where alternative escape routes could be compromised. Note swing of doors should be in direction of travel, unless less than 60 occupancy. Even then, effort should be made to avoid such a situation. You might get a better outcome through BS9999 which if properly employed can allow some valuable trade-offs. Your travel distance is from the furthest point, even should it be a store or loo.

The 400mm rule is a relaxation and applies only to a private stair. Private or otherwise, there is nothing in the technical booklet that would suggest consideration needs to be afforded for pocket doors on to stairs. I am in NI, still part of this completely disunited United Kingdom!

Best approach is zero tolerance for anything stored in a protected stair, ditto inside meter boxes. Quite apart from the unnecessary fire load /ignition source as appropriate, such items could be a serious trip hazard for both escapees and firefighters alike. Storing items in meter cupboards could damage electrical equipment and impede safe access for maintenance operatives. Were it up to me tenants would be given 30 days notice. Thereafter, they could recover their prams, scooters, bikes, hoovers etc from the skip!