AnthonyB

Is this a flat or a HMO? Self closing fire doors haven't been required in flats for a very long time. Bear in mind that a kitchen usually has a heat detector and the use of hold open devices is deprecated in these situations as there is a risk of delayed action until after the escape route is compromised.

It meets the sprit of 3.9 as there is separation between each landing and the stair which makes a stair OV acceptable - if the stairs were open to the landing they would need an AOV.

Certain information must, by law, now be shared or made available to residents and in relevant premises under the Building Safety Act residents are legally entitled to request access to a whole range of info including current and previous risk assessments, etc All premises (on occupancy and annually} "Responsible persons need to provide residents with instructions on: how to report a fire a reminder of what the evacuation strategy is for that building any other instruction that tells residents what they must do once a fire has occurred, based on the building’s evacuation strategy"

Worst case is communal L1 so all areas of the flats are covered (with suitable false alarm management designed in) as part of the main system - it's an option in the Purpose Built Flats guide for the worst cases that can never be upgraded with resort to compartmentation & smoke control. This sort of solution is expected for a Tudor age building and shouldn't be required for a 1985 build as there were regulations back then (although the 1985 Building Regs MoE requirements just pointed to the 70's version of CP3) so something must have really gone wrong with the build! I'm guessing the original plans and fire safety strategy (as far as one existed back then) are long gone. Retrofitting sprinklers and mist systems isn't impossible, but isn't easy either - remember you aren't expected to be to the latest new build standards in a building of this height & age, just a reasonable compromise to give an adequate level of safety. Flat internal layout is partly outside the scope of the FSO too. It's not one I can be definitive about without seeing it myself

It's not unheard of in PRU's & similar to have a variation in place to have key operated manual call points and all staff having keys backed up by L1 detection, higher staff ratios, CCTV monitoring and sprinklers to mitigate the call points being changed.

That's certainly the fire services view and I can see their point with it saying 'full extent'. Would using the higher than minimum level of detection relaxation in place of the high ceiling relaxation give you the same reduction in width? If so, it may be worth sounding out the fire service to see if they would be comfortable with that if you had a new fire/amended fire strategy to back it up. If they would be happy then the expense of the new paperwork is worth it, if not then you don't do it and think again as to your options (probably a determination).

As Neil says the BS isn't explicitly a legal requirement, but would probably be cited by prosecution & used by the Magistrate as reference to a standard that would meet the requirements of the legislation - you would need to show why not following this still provided adequate protection & thus no risk of serious injury or death to relevant persons Very few things in detail are explicit in the actual legislation, which sets broad functional aims, however many are implicit requirements, the onus being on the Duty Holder to show that an alternative approach would still equate to a suitable standard of safety.

Fire service case is based on this paragraph in BS9999 which is part of the list of conditions for applying variations to travel distance, exit & stair widths based on ceiling height. "b) the entire escape route, with the exception of corridors and lobbies, has a high ceiling;" Unfortunately a lot of things in buildings aren't picked up by Building Control and a completion certificate issued only for the premises to be subject to later enforcement (& sometimes successful prosecution) as their role is compliance with Building Regulations only and sometimes the certs are footnoted that they are not a guarantee that the premises fully meets other legislation nor every aspect of the build is up to spec hence a lot of buildings facing action for poor fire stopping and other issues. You have the option of a Secretary of State determination where there is a disagreement over the technical solutions to meeting Fire Safety Legislation or an appeal at Magistrates Court if you feel an Enforcement Notice is not warranted by the situation, but this will involve expense and experts to build & present your case.

The legislation as written does not consider fire fighters in the course of operational fire fighting duties to be relevant persons so in essence - no!

If the stair is a protected route then it should be free from obstruction & clear of combustibles (your fire risk assessment and if the building is modern enough the fire strategy will determine this). Non combustible items could be tolerated but require careful management and monitoring as when people see some stuff stored there they tend to assume they can add to it and combustibles can start to creep in! In the old days of the Fire Certificate combustibles in a protected stair would be a breach of the certificate and thus an offence.

If the original front doors are still fitted, in good condition and are to the fire door standard of the time then it's likely they would still be accepted under current guidance. If the original doors are not fire doors in any shape or form it would be useful if it was known if there was a relaxation at the time of build - it's modern enough for there to have been suitable fire safety requirements in Building Regs. As it need a fire risk assessment it's best for the assessor to look on site and make a decision as the then building guidance and current guidance doesn't really cover this layout. A retrospective fire strategy to set in stone the arrangements might be of use to stop the issue resurfacing again & again in future.

Possibly, but I can still give you some desktop pointers as to whether the requirements seem way off if I get copies of reports. Sometimes a block does require capital expenditure, but it's by no means a given.

If you only have a single common escape stair and route you don't need fire exit signage. There should be a fire procedure notice, but these don't have to everywhere. You will need fire doors, but Government Guidance allows risk assessors leeway in the type of doors in smaller lower risk properties - it's not always a new door and frame. A lot of FRAs will gold plate requirements as if it's a modern build, and don't use the guidance fully or correctly leading to unnecessary actions. Some sites will still need considerable expenditure but for others lesser actions are possible. Costs are high for accredited risk assessors - we have more personal criminal liability than ever before and increased insurance costs - and a cheap FRA is often more costly in the long run. A good risk assessor can save more than their fee - I've had blocks where residents were told they needed very expensive works, but after I did an FRA for them there was still expenditure but on a lesser scale (they had been quoted a 5 figure sum for a fire alarm system they didn't even need). A Fire Risk Assessment is required by law, one way or another the block requires one.

Whilst only a site visit & FRA (which legally you must have) can say for sure there will be a need for front fire doors of some sort even if the block requires a simultaneous evacuate policy as there is a risk the escape stair could be blocked. When was the conversion?

What age of build? Flat front doors invariably need to be fire doors regardless of other exits otherwise the flat of fire origin could take out both stairs - is there a third stair, what do you mean by flat fire escape?

Hi, I've helped out people on this forum with similar situations, including where taking cases to Tribunal. I'm on the Fire Risk Assessors' Register.

Internal exits via high risk rooms are usually a no-no and come under heavy scrutiny by inspecting officers when targeting commercial premises with sleeping accommodation. The whole reason for the external escape is likely to be due to the unsuitable internal route.

Internal doors would have been fire doors even when your house was built - Building Regulations are such that you must not make anything to a lesser standard than when originally approved. Whether an insurer would use this to reject or reduce a claim is up to the individual insurer, it depends on the wording of the policy. Similarly it depends on how in depth a surveyor is as to whether they would flag this up on a home buyers survey.

If that's just an external door, then based on the picture it does not require to be a fire resisting door set.

BS7273-4 is your initial guide here. It's also covered in the government risk assessment guides & Approved Document B. In Care Homes you sometimes see some of the failsafe's omitted to prevent dementia patients wandering off in an emergency - as evacuation is staff led you see the break glasses but the fire alarm link isn't active .

That's up to the designer, usually in conjunction with the risk assessor, every element above that required for L3 is specific to the design intent for that building - some would cover it, others might not, but both could be correct!

If they aren't fire doors in any shape or form then yes - if it's just that they aren't certified, not necessarily depending on the size & layout of the block. However the age of the doors can be critical too - note this from the latest statutory guidance from the Government: It is reasonable to assume that composite flat entrance doors manufactured after late 2018 have adequate fire resistance. However, this might not be the case if the doors were manufactured before this time. After the Grenfell Tower fire in 2017, a composite flat entrance door installed at Grenfell Tower achieved only 15 minutes’ fire resistance when tested. The door was manufactured by Manse Masterdor (a company that no longer exists), and a number of the company’s composite flat entrance doors, although designed to provide 30 minutes’ fire resistance, failed to do so when tested. This led to tests of a range of manufacturers’ composite fire doors by Government. It was found that, depending on the manufacturer and the model of door, the fire resistance of these doors ranged from eight minutes to over 30 minutes. Common points of failure were letterboxes and glazing (e.g. as a result of manufacturing defects, such as in the means of securing the glazing). Where the point of failure was the letterbox, remedial work can often be carried out by the manufacturer or a specialist contactor on site. This might also be possible in the case of the glazing. In case of doubt, advice of the manufacturer should be sought. A further issue is that the fire resistance of many composite doors was found to be different according to whether the door was tested from what would be the “common parts side” or the “flat side”; this was because, when originally tested, the doors were only tested from the “flat side”. If it can be confirmed (e.g. from documentation or liaison with the manufacturer/supplier) that the doors were supplied after late 2018, there should not be an issue, as the composite door industry doors are now tested from both sides. In the case of doors manufactured before 2018, you should seek further information regarding their likely fire resistance. The Government have published the results of their tests on specific manufacturers’ products, (www.gov.uk/government/publications-fire-door-testing-grp-composite-test-results) and information can be sought from the manufacturer or supplier of the doors. In the case of these “legacy” doors, it is normally acceptable for adequate fire resistance to be provided from the “flat side”, as it is not expected that there will be a serious fire, of the severity used in fire resistance testing, within the common parts. Provided that the doors would have been purchased as 30 minute fire-resisting doors, from the perspective of risk and compliance with fire safety legislation, no immediate action is normally necessary, provided the fire resistance of the doors is, at least, around 15-20 minutes; the doors should be replaced over time as part of routine maintenance. If you are in doubt regarding the adequacy of the fire resistance of composite flat entrance doors, you should seek the advice of a specialist, such as a third-party certificated fire risk assessor or fire safety consultant.

0No - it's valid to want to avoid false alarm activations, but technology is such (& has been for some time) that fire alarm systems can have an investigation period with only a local alarm on a smoke detector activating, with the failsafes of a timer which will sound all alarms if the system isn't silenced after a set time, or if a second detector activates or if a call point activates. Just silencing and relying on a human is risky and depending on system type and configuration can stop other detectors and call points on the zone being investigated from being able to activate the alarm. Deaths and prosecutions have resulted from premature silencing of systems.

Whatever non fire resisting cabling suits the situation. It's an urban myth EL cabling needs to be fire resistant (the one exception being for slave fittings off a central back up power source such as a central battery, inverter or generator) as should fire damage the cable it will failsafe onto it's internal battery unlike fire alarm devices which would just fail.

They are using the obsolescent LACORS Fire Safety Guide which has this view. The guide is being rewritten at the moment and it will be interesting to see if this approach is retained. Bear in mind though that a new build house or flat in England with a protected stair or hall with only detection in the escape route (or best escape route, kitchen and living room) would only require internal FD30 doors (no smoke brush/fin) so the principle isn't just confined to the older HMO guidance.